## aff

### nato good / withdrawal bad

#### NATO withdrawal fails – lack of deterrence, irreplaceability, and unchecked Russia risks global conflict

**Sweeney 2020** (Mike Sweeney is a Governmental Relations Professor at Colorado Tech with a BA and a masters in political science from Cal State, “What is NATO good for?”, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge?author=5e0b0db7a5b0832cb771a63e> )//MargaretE

NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. **Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes**. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence. Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, **it could make it more likely.** Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO? Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures. This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy. NATO’s advocates are also prone to hyperbole, but one word that is not an overstatement is irreplaceable. **It would be difficult—if not impossible—to recreate NATO or something like it from scratch.** Still, even irreplaceable doesn’t imply permanence if the alliance’s value cannot readily be established and sold to the populations of its constituent members, especially Americans. Demography is not on the alliance’s side. Should NATO survive to celebrate its centennial, the generation being born at that time will be as far removed from the end of the Second World War as someone born in 1969 was from the conclusion of the American Civil War. Even the September 11th attacks—and NATO’s ensuing invocation of Article 5—will be a half century in the past. In short, shared historical experience or even simple nostalgia will not be enough to sustain the alliance through the twenty-first century. NATO needs to show that it is not just relevant, but crucial to continued security in Europe and, to be blunt, the broader interests of its essential member, the United States. The most effective way of doing that is reinforcing the image of NATO as a vehicle for stability, something which has been recently diminished. There are legitimate arguments to be made that NATO now endangers American security by having antagonized Russia through enlargement and increased the likelihood of confrontation, possibly a nuclear one, rather than decreasing it.[15] That relations between America and Russia—and overall stability in Eastern Europe—might be far worse without the alliance is also true, but is a difficult sell in trying to promote the alliance’s relevance. NATO needs to be an active participant in visibly promoting stability, beyond the important day-to-day but low-key role it plays in this regard. Some potential steps are obvious, the most high profile of which would be a public declaration on closing the alliance to further expansion after the current candidacy of North Macedonia is vetted. To be clear, such a move need not be taken in a vacuum. In general, NATO must engage with Russia and some sort of quid pro quo shouldn’t be ruled out on ending further expansion of the alliance. Cessation of Moscow’s support for separatist activities in Transnistria and the Donbass certainly should be on the table as should guarantees from Russia that Belarus and Ukraine would be free to pursue their own independent relationships with the West, perhaps to someday include the possibility of membership in the European Union if either state wants it.[16]

#### Withdrawal blows up the world--causes Russian SOI AND balkanization.

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What would a world without NATO look like? It is a useful question to ask. For the end of NATO would mean far more than merely the disappearance of a bureaucracy at the outskirts of Brussels. The end of NATO would mean the end of a unique institutionalized political and military link between Europe and North America—with consequences that range from merely uncomfortable to outright dangerous.

The end of NATO would be the end of transatlantic collective defense. Europe would have to provide for its security without the United States. Establishing a purely European defense, however, would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially, and militarily. Not only would it require significantly higher defense expenditures, but also massive investments in defense research and development and much more rationalized defense procurement – just when the United Kingdom, Europe’s biggest defense player, is distancing itself from the EU. It would ultimately require a genuine European security policy, including a consensus on a European nuclear deterrent. In short, it would require a quantum leap in the process of European integration that is utterly unrealistic.

At the same time, the end of NATO would dramatically increase Russia’s weight and influence in European security. Without the American commitment to the old continent, the opportunities for Russia to divide and marginalize Europe would grow. This would be a strategic disaster in particular for many countries in the post-Soviet space, who would be condemned, once again, to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence.

#### NATO key to Russia deterrence, prosperity, and democracy – outweighs economic costs

**Lloyd 2019** (Lindsay Lloyd is the Senior Advisor, Freedom and Democracy at the George W. Bush Institute. He previously served as Director of the Human Freedom Initiative at the Bush Institute, where he led original research and programmatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy in the world, “NATO: still relevant in a dangerous world” <https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/global-challenges/lloyd-nato-still-relevant-in-a-dangerous-world.html)> //MargaretE

This year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization marks its 70th anniversary. In the world of international statecraft, such long-lasting alliances are exceedingly rare. NATO’s longevity is due in part to the fact that it combines national interest, which can be fleeting, with national values, which are hopefully more lasting. The initial alliance between the United States, Canada, and 10 European nations founded in 1949 has grown to encompass 29 countries. Once ratified by all current members, North Macedonia will join as NATO’s 30th member. Some, though, most notably the president of the United States, have questioned whether NATO membership is still in the U.S. national interest. **While the White House avers that the U.S. commitment to NATO remains solid, even the perception of a breach between Europe and America would foster Russia’s longstanding desire to rupture the alliance.** The Trump administration’s concern over burden sharing is by no means a new issue – it has been an off-and-on irritant over much of the alliance’s history. In the 1970s, Europe was spending approximately 45 percent of what the United States was spending on defense. The Center for Transatlantic Relations notes that three factors combined to address the disparity: Moscow was becoming more belligerent, America was preoccupied in a longstanding conflict in Vietnam, and Europe was enjoying a period of relative prosperity. By the end of the Cold War, Europe was spending approximately 78 percent of U.S. levels. Today’s situation is somewhat analogous: Moscow is becoming more belligerent, America is engaged in a 17-year war in Afghanistan (side-by-side with our NATO allies), and Europe is enjoying relative prosperity. And European defense spending is beginning to rise. As Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for Europe from 2005 to 2009, put it, “By all means, America should push for greater allied defense spending. But today (and everyday) let’s also remember — and respect — the sacrifice that others have made for us.” The values that bind the alliance have remained constant, but NATO has not been static. In fact, its durability is linked to its flexibility – changing and modernizing as threats have grown and receded. It’s important to recognize that NATO succeeded in its core historical mission – deterring an aggressive rival and keeping the West strong and free. Established in the first phase of the Cold War, NATO was one response to the vacuum created after World War I, when America sought to disengage from Europe’s power struggles and conflicts. In contrast to the Senate’s refusal to approve the treaty establishing the League of Nations, America sought after World War II to fashion a new and lasting international architecture. That included the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the forerunner of the World Trade Organization), and a host of security agreements and alliances, most notably NATO. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman and continuing through the Cold War, presidents and Congresses of both parties embraced this American-made architecture that helped the United States realize historic prosperity, saw freedom expand across the globe, and prevented a devastating nuclear war with an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. While regional conflicts were frequent and often bloody, the theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) contained the 50-year standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The uneasy peace was costly and often tense – the Cuban Missile Crisis, conflict in the Middle East, Vietnam – but a cataclysmic third world war was avoided. Western resolve, expressed in the alliance, prevented Soviet aggression and victory. The reduced tensions of détente largely fell apart after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, awakening Americans and Europeans alike to the fact that the Soviets still posed an existential threat. The decision to deploy a new class of missiles in Europe spawned the nuclear freeze movement and severely strained the alliance. But the fact that NATO held together was a key moment in the Soviet Union’s defeat. Western resolve placed unsustainable pressure on the Soviets and their allies. The system collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a new Soviet leader found it impossible to compete. The rise of the independent labor union Solidarity in Poland led to free elections, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused to intervene. The fall of the Berlin Wall and a series of mostly bloodless revolutions rolled out across Central and Eastern Europe. And long suppressed nationalism within the Soviet Union – in Lithuania, Ukraine, and elsewhere – led to the dissolution of the USSR itself on December 26, 1991. The map of Europe was remade. Fifteen states emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Most of them, including Russia, sought a democratic and free market future. Many declared their ambition to join the European Union and NATO. Over the next two decades, 13 post-communist nations took their rightful places as full members of the North Atlantic Alliance. But the question arose – what was the purpose of NATO when its main foe was no longer a threat (or even existed)? Since the fall of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, NATO has reinvented itself. The alliance built to face down the Soviets has taken on new challenges and missions, proving it remains **the most important U.S. alliance.** NATO’s current mission was laid out in 2010. The alliance remains a mutual defense pact – each member commits to defend the others against attack, including against “new threats to the safety of our citizens.” It also maps out the importance of conflict management – preventing and managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations. NATO is committed to working with partners around the globe, to working toward a world without nuclear weapons, and to allow European democracies that meet the standards for membership to join the alliance. One of the first major tests for the post-Soviet NATO occurred after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. NATO took the leading role in ending the fighting and bringing stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1999 on, NATO has played a similar role in Kosovo. Ending the bloodshed was a key U.S. political priority during the Clinton administration. While the United States could have addressed these crises alone, our NATO partners worked with us and carried some of the load. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO’s Article V was activated for the first and only time in the alliance’s history. Article V of the NATO Treaty commits each member to defend the others when under attack. For America’s NATO partners, the attacks on Washington and New York were just the same as an attack on Rome, Berlin, Toronto, or Oslo. Invoking Article V was more than just a rhetorical expression of solidarity – our NATO allies, along with other partners like Australia, have fought with the United States in Afghanistan. More than 1,000 soldiers from NATO partners have been killed. While you may disagree on the merits of American involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan – they were national security priorities of the U.S. government. In each conflict, America’s NATO partners took up arms in American-led engagements. Having allied support lessened the burden and furthered the security priorities of the United States. Sadly, the original rationale for NATO has returned in new, insidious ways. The Russian experiment with democracy that begin in the late 1980s has been all but extinguished. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has moved away from liberalism and democracy toward a state now best characterized by authoritarianism, crony capitalism, and corruption. Most importantly, Putin has acted aggressively to restore power and land lost when the Soviet Empire imploded. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, on the south of Ukraine. Moscow has sought to encourage separatist movements in several former Soviet republics. In 2014, Russia stepped up its longstanding military interference in Ukraine by annexing Crimea. And in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has pursued aggressive policies, aimed at restoring its influence. Countries across the region have faced new kinds of threats, as Moscow works to manipulate and discredit democratic institutions. Moscow has also sought to silence critics and boost its influence in longstanding democracies. In 2006, former intelligence agent Alexander Litvinenko was assassinated in the United Kingdom. Cyberattacks have been detected in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and elsewhere. And in the United States, Russia undertook an unprecedented campaign to stoke divisions and influence the 2016 election campaign. While the immediate threat of military conflict between Russia and the United States is low, Russia and other states pose a serious and changing threat to America and its allies. **NATO is an essential first line of defense.**.NATO’s mission remains first as a military alliance, but from the earliest days, it was also a community of values. And while at times NATO has chosen to look the other way, promoting democracy among its members has always been a consideration. Article 10 of the NATO Charter states that by unanimous agreement, any other European state that can further the principles of the alliance and contribute to its security may be asked to join. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, even though both countries underwent long periods of military rule. Even today, with rising concerns about democratic backsliding in countries like Hungary and Turkey, both countries remain active members of the alliance. But NATO’s commitment to values became much more explicit as the former communist nations began jockeying for inclusion. Would-be members must demonstrate they are market economies and stable democracies based on a respect for human rights and the rule of law. Aspirants must live in peace with their neighbors, peacefully resolving disputes. And joining NATO requires civilian and democratic control over the military. Seventy years on, NATO remains a vital partnership and resource for the United States. It has contributed blood and treasure to the two most recent major conflicts – Iraq and Afghanistan. It has adapted in response to the new threats emanating from Moscow, shoring up defenses in the Baltic region, partnering with states in Russia’s crosshairs like Ukraine and Georgia, and providing important communications and coordination to defend against the ongoing cyberwarfare. NATO’s critics are not wrong to urge increased defense spending across the alliance. Most American presidents have done so and our NATO allies are responding to the call. But the United States as a global power will always shoulder a greater share of the burden. As this history shows, **we should look at NATO not as a drain on our resources, but rather as a net plus**. America and its NATO allies have faced tensions and estrangement over policy issues. But even when tensions have been high, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have always recognized that the alliance is mutually beneficial. Fundamentally, NATO has endured because it is a community of shared values – of democracy, freedom, market economics, solidarity, and mutual respect. The United States and our partners share a strong interest in preserving this partnership – it has worked to our common benefit for 70 years and continues to do so today.

NATO strength is an impact filter – extinction

Gallagher and Dueck 19 – (Mike Gallagher and Colin Dueck; "The Conservative Case for NATO"; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/; 1-30-2019, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-AZ

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

**American presence in NATO is crucial to Chinese and Russian deterrence**

Gallagher and Dueck 19 – (Mike Gallagher and Colin Dueck; "The Conservative Case for NATO"; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/; 1-30-2019, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-AZ

Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

The irony is that the Trump administration actually has a success story to tell about its policies toward NATO and Russia, particularly in Europe. Under this administration, the U.S. has provided lethal aid to Ukraine to fight off Russian-backed insurgents. It has made no concessions to Moscow regarding that conflict. It has increased sanctions against Russia and boosted America’s military presence in Eastern Europe. It has increased funding to the European Defense Initiative, bolstered U.S. defense spending, held Russia accountable for its breach of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) Treaty, and explored the place of low-yield nuclear weapons as a necessary component of the American arsenal to deter Russian aggression. At the same time, the president’s calls for increased European defense spending have had some useful effects. Virtually all NATO allies have increased their levels of defense spending over the past two years. As president, Mr. Trump has regularly reiterated his support for NATO. The concomitant emphasis on allied burden-sharing is not unreasonable, as Eisenhower regularly insisted.

In keeping with its treaty powers under the U.S. Constitution, Congress should not be passive on this issue. Last week, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a bill to express continuing congressional support for the NATO alliance. The bill passed by a vote of 357 to 22 in the House of Representatives. The Senate is working on similar legislation.

Public-opinion polls taken over the last three years show that a solid majority of Trump supporters, conservatives, Republicans, and Americans continue to back the NATO alliance. Conservative voters in heartland states such as Wisconsin certainly expect Europeans to do their fair share in defending themselves. But they do not oppose NATO. On the contrary, they support it.

An overarching support for America’s Western alliance has been a key component in the conservative foreign-policy approach since Eisenhower’s time. It remains relevant to this day. As conservative Republicans and other Americans consider the costs and benefits of the U.S. alliance system, recall Ike’s wise recommendation: “Now boys, let’s not make our mistakes in a hurry.”

### perm: do both

#### Perm do both: US can leave NATO and cooperate with NATO countries independently – US and EU ties prove

**EU 2022** (European Union official statement on cooperation with the United States, “EU – US cooperation”, <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/international-activities/cooperation-governments/eu-us-cooperation_en> )//MargaretE

**The EU and US economies are the most integrated in the world.** While broadly acknowledging that this privileged relationship holds more potential for both sides, the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs has been working for many years to further promote transatlantic economic cooperation by reducing regulatory obstacles to doing business across the Atlantic. The cooperation focuses on diverging regulations or duplicative requirements that often cause unnecessary barriers and costs for companies, including small businesses.

The transatlantic economic and trade relationship remains the backbone of the world economy, contributing to growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Total US investment in the EU is 3 times higher than in all of Asia, whereas EU investment in the US is around 8 times the amount of EU investment in India and China together.

### at: russia

#### NATO is not to blame for the Russian invasion

**Stemplowska 22** -- Zofia Stemplowska is a Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. Published April 27, 2022. “NATO enlargement is not to blame for Russia’s war in Ukraine” <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/04/27/nato-enlargement-is-not-to-blame-for-russias-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

Is NATO enlargement partly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine war? Zofia Stemplowska argues that rather than blaming countries in eastern Europe for their desire to join NATO, we would be better served by examining the role Russian energy exports to western Europe have played in propping up Vladimir Putin’s regime.

**Many** voices in the UK and US press – in the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Guardian, and others – **suggest that NATO is partly to blame for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine**. The argument is that by accepting NATO enlargement up to Russia’s borders, and by failing to decisively rule out Ukrainian membership, NATO holds some responsibility for Russia’s invasion.

Does it matter whether NATO is partly to blame now that the war is underway, and all reasonable people condemn the aggression? I would argue that it does. First, we owe those who are defending themselves the correct moral evaluation of the causes of the war. Second, our views about who is to blame for a war influence our views on what is permissible as part of it, what is to be done after it has ended, and – crucially – how to behave in similar situations in future, when, for instance, Finland and Sweden apply for NATO membership.

However, blaming someone does not merely mean attributing to them causal responsibility for an outcome. It involves suggesting that things should have been done differently and that there are things to answer for. **The reality is that western states do hold some blame** for making the invasion possible, **but not because of NATO enlargement**. **By buying Russian energy** on Russian terms, **western states have effectively facilitated** corruption and authoritarianism inside **Russia**, strengthening Vladimir Putin’s regime despite its treatment of its neighbours.

Russia’s fears

Supporters of the ‘blame NATO’ argument offer the following rationale. Russia saw the enlargement of NATO as a threat to its security. Nonetheless, NATO proceeded to admit new members right up to Russia’s borders and refused to rule out further enlargement. The resulting war is unjustified since it is an act of aggression. But this act of aggression is in part an expression of Russia’s legitimate fear for its interests which it views as threatened by NATO.

When talking about Russia, I have in mind the Russian ruling group – chiefly Vladimir Putin – whose world view may be inaccurate but whose access to information is not restricted. Ordinary Russian citizens, in contrast, now find it increasingly difficult to learn what the world is like as opposed to what Putin would like them to believe.

When it comes to Russian officials, there can be no doubt that they have repeatedly expressed fears concerning NATO enlargement. It is worth noting that Russia has talked of NATO ‘expansion’, but that language carries connotations of territorial annexation. The Russian Federation ‘expanded’ when it annexed Crimea. NATO was enlarged, just as the EU was, when the new member states willingly joined.

Boris Yeltsin is quoted as saying that NATO enlargement would be ‘nothing but humiliation for Russia.’ He suggested a pan-European peace force. Regarding Ukraine in particular, the head of the CIA, William Burns, wrote in 2008 that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO ‘is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players…I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.’

In light of the present-day expressions of fear from Russia about the allegedly genocidal government in Ukraine, we know that Russia’s assertions about its fears can be entirely made up. But even if we credit the past and present statements about NATO enlargement as genuine, we can ask ourselves how legitimate or reasonable they were or are. If the fears express a desire to dominate Russia’s neighbours then those who indulge in them are to blame when those neighbours seek protection.

Russia’s fears express expectations of domination of the region

So how reasonable was Russia’s fear of NATO enlargement in the 1990s and since? NATO invaded Afghanistan and a US-led coalition of states invaded Iraq. But these wars were not against Russia. What of the fact that Russia was previously invaded from its western borders? Napoleon tried to conquer it. Hitler invaded it two years after both him and Stalin together invaded Poland (an act of long-planned aggression that the Soviet Union presented at the time as a defensive move). The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth captured the throne in Moscow in the early 17th century.

But it is not reasonable to assume that the past and disavowed conduct of a country is bound to be repeated no matter how the country has changed. NATO members do not celebrate the past Polish, French and German aggressions on Russia. They cannot be reasonably seen as indicative of any current aspirations. If we thought countries could not change, we would have to conclude that France currently poses a threat to the UK and Germany to Poland. Instead, Poland rejoiced when in the first week of the Russian war against Ukraine, on 27 February 2022, Germany announced its rearmament.

It is difficult to understand why Russia would fear its neighbours joining NATO if it cared about its own safety rather than its control of the region where it once had an empire. Why is it a ‘humiliation’ for Russia, as Yeltsin suggested, to have NATO members as its neighbours? A humiliation, moreover, that has to be dealt with, by Putin, with military attacks.

Why was there not a single voice in Russia in 2008, as Burns reported, that argued it would be acceptable for Ukraine to join NATO? If the fear in Russia is, as sometimes stated, that Ukraine’s nationalist policies threaten a civil war in Ukraine, which in turn threatens Russia’ border security, then we should expect at least some voices arguing for Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. Russia’s borders are the most stable where its neighbours have managed to join NATO and the EU.

So how does **the Russian government** portray NATO as a threat to itself? It **falsely claims that its own aggressions towards its neighbours are defensive**. In effect, Russia attacks with lethal force and claims to be defending itself. **It is the equivalent of an abuser justifying the murder of their victim** on the grounds that they both have a right to defend themselves. **The ‘blame NATO’ argument obscures this asymmetry in NATO-Russia relations. It does so when it credits Russia’s fear as legitimate.**

Blaming the victims

The ‘blame NATO’ argument also fails to credit the claims of the new, and aspiring, NATO members that Russia’s threat fully justifies NATO’s enlargement. Ukraine’s sovereign and democratic aspirations to join NATO, though unsuccessful, were purely defensive. Ukraine was occupied by Russia up to 1991 and for centuries beforehand.

It suffered the Holodomor in the 1930s: the deaths of millions as a result of Soviet policies that created a famine in Ukraine. The occupation and the brutal treatment of Ukrainians has not been disavowed by the current government of Russia, which sees itself as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and the Tsarist imperial vision beforehand. Ukraine has also suffered malicious interventions from Russia in its politics and ongoing attacks and coercive controlling of some of its territory – all within the last decade.

Russia’s insistence that Ukraine is not allowed, on pain of invasion, to democratically decide to join NATO and the EU amounts to insisting that countries that share a border with Russia are not entitled to be sovereign. For the same reason, those who mention what Russia allegedly was or was not ‘promised’ about Ukraine by the US or NATO miss the fundamental point that Russia is not entitled to decide what that future will be.

Some countries that had been dominated or controlled by the Soviet Union have succeeded in joining NATO. The narrative of NATO ‘expansionism’, which presents it as a negligent or even offensive strategy, obscures how difficult it was for those new member states to join. The fact that Russia continued to be feared by those states despite the demise of the Soviet bloc reflected Russia’s insistence that it would not accept their democratic decisions; that there was either going to be a new world order approved by Russia or no order at all.

This unwillingness to grant agency to the new member states is visible in much of the media coverage of the war in Ukraine. Questions such as ‘should NATO fear Putin?’ are sometimes posed and answered in the negative. It is true that Putin does not threaten the sovereignty of the old NATO members through the conventional method of territorial war. But if we see NATO as composed of all its current members, including those that have good reason to fear Putin, then **blaming NATO enlargement for Russia’s aggression** – and blaming Ukraine for aspiring to be in NATO – **means blaming the victims.**

#### Russian aggression not due to NATO

**Popova and Shevel 22** -- Maria Popova is Jean Monnet Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University. Oxana Shevel is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University’s School of Arts and Sciences. Published February 24, 2022. “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine is Essentially Not About NATO” <https://www.justsecurity.org/80343/russias-new-assault-on-ukraine-is-not-entirely-maybe-not-even-largely-about-nato/> //DG

In his Feb. 15 Just Security article “Ukraine: Unleashing the Rhetorical Dogs of War,” Barry Posen argued that NATO and Ukraine should have cut a deal with Russia because the Ukrainian military would surely be defeated by Russia without direct U.S./Western military participation and U.S. offers of equipment were only encouraging a potential Ukrainian insurgency against Russian occupation that would be as bloody as it would be futile. The prescription depends entirely on Posen’s assumption that to satisfy Russia, all Ukraine would have had to do would be “to swallow the bitter pill of accepting armed neutrality between NATO and Russia, rather than NATO membership.”

This assumption contradicts events of recent months and the historical record. While Vladimir Putin has claimed that his goal is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, he also insisted that he was just conducting military exercises. Instead, he is invading Ukraine again. He likewise insisted in 2014 that he wasn’t capturing Crimea, despite the presence of his unidentified “Little Green Men” and his subsequent annexation of the peninsula, or that he was not fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas area in the east all these years, despite all evidence to the contrary. There is no reason to take Putin at his word. His Feb. 21 diatribe conferring Russian recognition of independence for the two eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and his order for Russian troops to move in as ostensible “peacekeepers” shows clearly his disdain for diplomatic resolutions.

Moreover, **this is not even primarily about NATO**.

NATO’s eastward expansion may have played a role in straining the relationship between Russia and the West, but mainly because, for Russia, seeing former satellites eagerly abandon it for the greener pastures of Euro-Atlantic integration stung. However, **Putin’s rhetoric and actions over almost two decades reveal that his goals extend beyond imposing neutrality on Ukraine or even staving off further NATO expansion. The larger objective is to re-establish Russian political and cultural dominance over a nation that Putin sees as one with Russia**, and then follow up by undoing the European rules-based order and security architecture established in the aftermath of World War II. **Given these goals, Ukrainian neutrality is a woefully insufficient concession for Putin.**

**If Russia’s main concern had been NATO enlargement, it would have reacted with rhetoric and/or hostile actions in its neighborhood after each step in the NATO expansion process**. The largest wave of NATO’s eastward expansion took place in March 2004, when seven Eastern European countries joined, including the formerly Soviet Baltic states. Russia “grumbled,” as the New York Times put it then, by adopting a Duma resolution criticizing the expansion, but **no hostile and sustained rhetoric followed about NATO enlargement** as a Western plot against Russian interests.

### at: finland/Sweden turn

#### Non-unique or no link – negotiations are taking time but have nothing to do with mistrust

**Gumrukcu et al 6/20.** Tuvan, and Ali Kucukgocmen; Additional reporting by Anne Kauranen in Helsinki; Editing by Alex Richardson and Angus MacSwan “Turkey says summit is not deadline for talks on Finland and Sweden's NATO bids” https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-says-talks-finland-swedens-nato-bids-continue-summit-not-deadline-2022-06-20/

ANKARA, June 20 (Reuters) - Discussions between Turkey, Finland and Sweden about the Nordic countries' NATO membership will continue and an alliance summit in Madrid next week is not a deadline, Turkey said after talks in Brussels on Monday. Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But the bids have faced opposition from Turkey, which has been angered by what it says is Helsinki and Stockholm's support for Kurdish militants and arms embargoes on Ankara. Last week, Turkey said documents it received from Sweden and NATO in response to the earlier written demands it presented the two candidates were far from meeting its expectations and any negotiations must first address Turkish concerns. read more Speaking to reporters in Brussels alongside Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Onal, Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said Ankara was expecting Sweden to take immediate steps regarding actions by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militant group in its country. Any progress on the Nordic membership bids "**now depends on the direction and speed at which these countries will take steps**," he said. The talks in Brussels with officials from Sweden, Finland, and NATO were held in an "open and sincere atmosphere," he said. "As we see these steps, we will all have the opportunity to evaluate the direction of this process," he said. Onal said Turkey expected a change of approach from Sweden and Finland, and Ankara needed "binding promises" to address its concerns. "We don't see ourselves limited by any timetable. The speed, scope of this process depends on these nations' manner and speed of meeting our expectations," he said. Petri Hakkarainen, foreign and security adviser to Finland's president and the head of the Finnish delegation at the talks in Brussels, said the sides had made "clear progress" on certain issues. But it would take time to reach an understanding on others, he said. NATO leaders will convene in Madrid on June 29-30. Any NATO membership requires approval of all 30 members of the alliance. Turkey has been a NATO ally for more than 70 years and has the alliance's second biggest army.

#### Non-unique – Turkey won’t get in the way of Finland joining

**Falk 5/18.** Thomas, journalist and political commentator. “How long will it take for Finland and Sweden to join NATO?” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/18/finland-and-swedens-fast-tracked-nato-membership

And all NATO members have to vote unanimously in favour of the candidates for this to be possible.

Analysts said this is **highly likely despite the latest news that Turkey is opposed** to the new potential members.

“There have been some rumblings of discontent or even objections in Hungary and Turkey, but in the end, they will accept their membership of NATO,” Shepherd noted.

Once the invitation is received, official accession talks are held at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, followed by meetings with Sweden and Finland.

Then, declarations of commitment are sent in which they agree to fulfil NATO obligations.

In some cases, potential candidates must indicate a timeline if reforms are required, to meet all eligibility criteria.

NATO then prepares for the adaptation of its treaty by means of the accession protocols, which have to be ratified.

“All members, including the candidate countries, would need to ratify their joining the Washington Treaty according to their own national procedures. In the case of the US, which is where the Washington Treaty is deposited, that requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate,” Lanoszka explained.

#### Non unique—Turkey dropped objections to Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids

Aljazeera 6/28 (Aljazeera, “Finland, Sweden on path to NATO membership as Turkey drops veto,” 6/28/2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/28/erdogan-to-have-bilateral-talks-with-world-leaders-at-nato-summit)-> LH

NATO ally Turkey has lifted its veto over Finland and Sweden’s bid to join the Western alliance after the three nations agreed to protect each other’s security, ending a weeks-long drama that tested allied unity against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The breakthrough came on Tuesday after four hours of talks just before a NATO summit began in Madrid, averting an embarrassing impasse at the gathering of 30 leaders that aimed to show resolve against Russia.

The lifting of the veto means that Helsinki and Stockholm can proceed with their application to join the military alliance, cementing what is set to be the biggest shift in European security in decades, as the two, long neutral Nordic countries seek NATO protection.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and Turkey’s presidency confirmed the accord in separate statements, after talks between the NATO chief, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, and Finnish President Sauli Niinisto.

#### Non-UQ: Finland and Sweden already invited into NATO and Turkey doesn’t care

Erlanger et. al 6/28/22 (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels, Valerie Hopkins is an international correspondent for The New York Times covering the war in Ukraine, as well as Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union, Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times, Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winning reporter in the Washington bureau, where he covers President Biden, with a focus on domestic policy, the regulatory state and life at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, In Blow to Putin, Turkey Won’t Bar Sweden and Finland From NATO, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/28/world/europe/nato-finland-sweden-ukraine.html?amp%3Bemc=edit_nn_20220629&amp%3Binstance_id=65309&amp%3Bnl=the-morning&amp%3Bregi_id=72546077&amp%3Bsegment_id=97102&amp%3Bte=1&amp%3Buser_id=4ba8174c20c87fea97e02e5885b4d9f9&campaign_id=9> )//MargaretE

MADRID — NATO’s top official said Tuesday that **Turkey had dropped its objections to the membership of Sweden and Finland**, two historically nonaligned nations that, alarmed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have asked to join the military alliance. Turkey’s reversal is a blow to President Vladimir V. Putin, who in justifying the invasion of his neighbor bitterly protested previous expansions of NATO — and Ukraine’s efforts to join the alliance — as a threat to his country’s security. Should Finland and Sweden be formally adopted into the alliance, as is widely expected, Russia will look across 800 miles of border with Finland at one of NATO’s newest members. The announcement came after Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met for four hours with Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of Sweden and President Sauli Niinisto of Finland, as NATO heads of state gathered in Madrid for an annual summit. The 30-nation alliance operates by consensus, which meant that Turkey effectively held a veto over their membership applications. “I’m pleased to announce that we now have an agreement that paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO,” the secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said Tuesday evening. “Turkey, Finland and Sweden have signed a memorandum that addresses Turkey’s concerns, including around arms exports, and the fight against terrorism

#### Finland and Sweden already invited into NATO – Turkey dropped its objections

Erlanger and Shear 6/29/22 (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels, Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winning reporter in the Washington bureau, where he covers President Biden, with a focus on domestic policy, the regulatory state and life at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NATO formally invites Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/world/europe/nato-sweden-finland.html?searchResultPosition=5> )//MargaretE

MADRID — NATO leaders on Wednesday formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, one day after Turkey dropped its objections to their membership, clearing the way for what would be one of the most significant expansions of the alliance in decades. The historic deal, following Turkey’s agreement to a memorandum with the two Nordic countries, underscores how the war in Ukraine has backfired for President Vladimir V. Putin, subverting Russian efforts to weaken NATO and pushing Sweden and Finland, which were neutral and nonaligned for decades, into the alliance’s arms. After weeks of talks, capped by an hourslong meeting in Madrid, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey agreed to lift his block on Sweden and Finland’s membership in return for a set of actions and promises that they will act against terrorism and terrorist organizations. “As NATO allies, Finland and Sweden commit to fully support Turkey against threats to its national security,” NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, said, providing some details of the agreement. “This includes further amending their domestic legislation, cracking down on P.K.K. activities and entering into an agreement with Turkey on extradition,” he added, referring to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which seeks an independent Kurdish state on territory partly within Turkey’s borders.

### at: bri

#### BRI has no plan and causes massive debt – it fails to do anything

**Wan 19** – Andrew Wan is a research assistant. (“A ROAD TO NOWHERE? PROBLEMS WITH CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE,” Baker Institute. June 27th, 2019. <https://blog.bakerinstitute.org/2019/06/27/a-road-to-nowhere-problems-with-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>) CTF

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be the most talked-about development plan of the century. Xi Jinping’s signature plan has captured the world’s attention since its announcement in 2013, with comparisons drawn to the ancient Silk Road and the Marshall Plan. But recently, worldwide coverage of the BRI has grown less favorable and more critical. Has BRI lost its luster?

The BRI now includes around 3,000 projects, according to official Chinese sources. The majority of the BRI projects involve constructing infrastructure to facilitate trade, which requires collaborating with partner countries to secure lending agreements and territory rights. BRI’s flagship project and biggest success is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a road and cable link between Pakistan’s Gwadar port to Xinjiang, China. China’s BRI relies on projects financed by Chinese policy and commercial banks rather than FDI, which requires massive capital flow to partner countries in the form of Chinese loans. This model makes sense when considering China’s industrial overcapacity dilemma; facing economic setbacks, China has already begun consolidating manufacturing companies to prevent defaults on loans. China sees foreign projects as an easy way for its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to secure contracts and minimize losses.

However, these massive lending projects have led to partner countries accruing extreme debt. This problem was brought to the forefront of China’s second Belt and Road Forum in April. Several previous delegations refused to attend this year, protesting growing concerns that China both has unethical standards and leverages debts as a diplomatic bargaining chip in its BRI strategy. Notably, Turkey also cited concerns for China’s blatant oppression, through heavy policing and internment camps, of Uighurs living along BRI pathways. Malaysia’s prime minister, during renegotiations of nearly $23 billion in rail/pipeline deals, called BRI agreements “unequal treaties” and “a new version of colonialism” before cancelling the deals altogether. Other countries have already paid the price. Sri Lanka’s inability to resolve an $8 billion loan for its Hambantota Port in 2017 led to a debt-for-equity swap accompanied by a 99-year lease for managing the port. Even Pakistan’s CPEC venture has necessitated a $6 billion bailout from the IMF. Debt distress is a common trend with BRI projects, and although asset seizure is rare, this trend raises valid concerns about the sustainability and methods of BRI projects.

It remains unclear the degree to which BRI, a Chinese-led bilateral initiative that employs some multilateral mechanisms to achieve financing goals, will be guided by multilateral standards on debt sustainability. A key factor in creating and maintaining successful deals lies in the stability of partner countries. BRI’s partners tend to welcome China’s “no strings attached” style of investment compared to lending by Western powers conditioned on environmental concerns, human rights, and other obligations. Although China’s system is appealing for many developing countries, it has enabled corruption while allowing governments to burden their countries with unpayable debts. The reality is that, apart from pushing its political agenda, the West’s requirements were attached in order to lower the risk of failure. The BRI’s lack of requirements signals either an absence of educated, informed planning or a deliberate decision to create debt stress in BRI’s partners.

The instinct may be to accept the latter conclusion, believing criticism that the BRI’s underlying motive is to expand China’s geopolitical influence through a veil of economic development. But the former seems just as plausible. For all of its hype, no one, not even China, seems to know exactly what the BRI is. Aside from vague policy objectives, there are no concrete policies that define the BRI. This lack of vision and cohesion has already led to widespread inefficiency. Studies have demonstrated that BRI projects do not align with the BRI’s proposed “geographic corridors.” This incoherence, combined with looming industrial overcapacity, paints a credible picture that the BRI is demand-driven and opportunistic rather than supply-driven and centrally planned. Additionally, the vague nature of the BRI allows its brand to be extended to almost anything, from fashion shows to dentistry to projects that lack any Chinese involvement, all of which damage the credibility of BRI. Distrust of the BRI brand, in turn, stifles private investment domestically (only 12% of FDI goes to BRI countries) and abroad (former UK PM David Cameron’s UK-China fund is struggling to secure investors), which ensures that the BRI continues to rely on precarious sovereign lending projects.

### at: climate

#### NATO is on track to reduce emission and challenge conflicts that arise from warming

IISD 21 – The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) is a think tank oriented around promoting green growth. (“NATO Adopts Climate Change Actions for 2030,” IISD. June 24th, 2021. <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/nato-adopts-climate-change-actions-for-2030/)> CTF

The Heads of State and Government of the 30 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have adopted NATO 2030, “a transatlantic agenda for the future,” as well as a Climate Change and Security Action Plan. The Action Plan provides a framework to deliver on the Climate Change and Security Agenda endorsed by NATO Foreign Ministers on 23-24 March 2021. The NATO Deputy Secretary-General said the decisions make the fight against climate change an important task for NATO for the first time.

The leaders gathered for a one-day meeting on 14 June 2021, in Brussels, Belgium, resulting in the Brussels Summit Communique. In the Summit outcome, the leaders identify climate change as a “threat multiplier that impacts Allied security” and say it tests resilience and civil preparedness, affects planning and the resilience of military installations and critical infrastructure, and “may create harsher conditions for our operations.

In the Communique, the leaders agree to:

Aim for NATO to become the leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security;

Significantly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from military activities and installations, formulate a target for reducing GHG emissions by NATO political and military structures and facilities, and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by 2050;

Initiate a regular high-level dialogue on climate and security to exchange views and coordinate further action; and

Incorporate climate change considerations into NATO’s full spectrum of work, including defense planning, capability development, and civil preparedness and exercises.

Also adopted on 14 June, the action plan explains that climate change makes it harder for militaries to carry out their tasks, due to greater temperature extremes, sea level rise, rapid changes in precipitation patterns, and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. The effects of climate change (e.g. desertification and the opening up of new shipping lanes) may influence the behavior of national governments in ways that increase instability and competition. In addition, the disproportionate impacts of climate change on women and girls and poor, vulnerable, or marginalized populations can create conditions to be exploited in ways that threaten or challenge the Alliance, the action plan states.

The action plan includes conducting annual assessments of the impact of climate change on NATO’s strategic environment as well as on missions and operations. It says NATO must account for impacts of climate change on security in order to perform its three core tasks: collective defense; crisis management; and cooperative security.

NATO will issue its first Climate Change and Security Progress Report at the 2022 Summit to track progress and re-assess the level of ambition.

### at: china deterrence

#### NATO cohesion key to deter China – aff turns the net benefit

Odgaard 2022 (Lisa Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on US-China-Europe relations, NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145> )//MargaretE

The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. **NATO is key** to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the **US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China** sufficiently.

### at: eu

#### [A](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imagining-a-world-without-nato/) collective EU defense is impossible

Rühle 18 - Michael Rühle heads the Energy Security Section of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. (“Imagining a world without NATO,” Atlantic Council. August 18th, 2018. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imagining-a-world-without-nato/>) CTF

What would a world without NATO look like? It is a useful question to ask. For the end of NATO would mean far more than merely the disappearance of a bureaucracy at the outskirts of Brussels. The end of NATO would mean the end of a unique institutionalized political and military link between Europe and North America—with consequences that range from merely uncomfortable to outright dangerous.

The end of NATO would be the end of transatlantic collective defense. Europe would have to provide for its security without the United States. Establishing a purely European defense, however, would **overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially, and militarily**. Not only would it require significantly higher defense expenditures, but also massive investments in defense research and development and much more rationalized defense procurement – just when the United Kingdom, Europe’s biggest defense player, is distancing itself from the EU. It would ultimately require a genuine European security policy, including a consensus on a European nuclear deterrent. In short, it would require a quantum leap in the process of European integration that is utterly unrealistic.

At the same time, the end of NATO would dramatically increase Russia’s weight and influence in European security. Without the American commitment to the old continent, the opportunities for Russia to divide and marginalize Europe would grow. This would be a strategic disaster in particular for many countries in the post-Soviet space, who would be condemned, once again, to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence.

With the end of NATO, Europe and North America would also lose an important framework for legitimizing the collective use of military power. Ambitious long-term stabilization operations like the one in Afghanistan are only possible in a transatlantic context. While ad hoc military coalitions between the United States and some European states would still be possible, the end of joint military planning and regular exercising within NATO would rapidly downgrade military interoperability.

The end of NATO would also encourage a regionalization of European security. Without the Alliance as a strategic framework for balancing different regional concerns, Southern European nations would likely concentrate on the Maghreb and the Middle East, while Eastern European states would focus on Russia. None of these regional groupings, however, would be politically coherent and militarily powerful enough to exert decisive influence in these areas. The result would be a further weakening of European security.

By contrast, the end of NATO would not achieve what some may hope for: to free the United States of a major financial burden. Since the US defense budget reflects the country’s global reach, the end of NATO would provide only marginal savings. By ceding its role as a “European power,” however, the United States would not only lose strategically important military bases on the old continent, but also its political influence in European security affairs, and the stability generated through daily consultations with its NATO Allies. The geopolitical winners would be Russia, China, and all those who seek to weaken the role of the United States in upholding international order. This would not just be a bad deal, a term that is now increasingly used in international relations. It would be an awful deal.

#### EU military fails and can’t

Naumann 19 - Klaus Naumann is a retired German general who served as chief of defense of the Bundeswehr from 1991 to 1996 and as chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999. (“Even if prudent, there will be no European army any time soon,” The German Times. February 15th, 2019. <https://www.german-times.com/even-if-prudent-there-will-be-no-european-army-any-time-soon/>) CTF

Concerns are growing in many European countries that they can no longer depend on the United States and the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. President Trump’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria marked the end of US reliability. Doubts about America’s trustworthiness have produced a flurry of driveling speeches in 2018 on the idea of a European army. So – what about it?

It is an old idea, which failed first in 1954 when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the European Defence Union treaty. It has since resurfaced from time to time but was never agreed upon and implemented. Will it fare better now, five years after the wake-up call produced by Russia’s illegal seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine?

Quite a few initiatives have been launched in recent years. Twenty five EU members agreed on establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Its tiny steps towards building common force components compelled some to rekindle dreams of a European Defense Union. Within NATO, a similar German initiative was agreed upon: the NATO Framework Concept (NFC). Other political ideas have popped up, such as the creation of a European Security Council, the establishment of a Defense Committee of the European Parliament and the suggestion – a ridiculous one considering its legal impossibility – that France renounce its permanent membership in the UN Security Council and hand it over to the EU. While all were well-intended, there is simply no coherent political will to establish a common defense of Europe, to accept majority decisions or to transfer the defense portion of national sovereignty to a supranational organization – even a European one.

At any rate, such a body would have to be more inclusive than the EU. Defending Europe is politically impossible without the inclusion of the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland and even Turkey. And in terms of geostrategy, it is not feasible without control of the North Atlantic and adjacent parts of the Arctic Ocean.

As long as this reality persists, there will be no meaningful European Security and Defense Strategy leading to command and control arrangements, to joint operational concepts and to a common and, above all, comprehensive planning process encompassing all political and diplomatic tools: economic instruments, police capacities, security and disaster relief elements and military forces that can operate throughout Europe and its periphery on land, in the air, at sea, in outer space **and in cyberspace.**

None of the steps taken so far make much of a difference. The sad European reality will thus continue. Our armies will comprise 17 different tanks, 26 different howitzers, 20 different combat aircraft and 29 different frigates or destroyers. Europe’s defense budgets combined total approximately 50 percent of the US budget, while the military manpower of the Europeans is close to 50 percent greater than that of the US, yet the combat power of the Europeans is at best 20 percent of what the US armed forces can marshal.

Moreover, a unanimous decision on the use of European military power is rather unlikely; if such a decision were made, the command arrangements would be patchy at best. The EU Battlegroups established in 2004 is a telling example: They never saw action.

#### The EU cannot fill in – failed on Ukraine and are reliant on NATO

**Vicente 5/4/22** -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

**The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed Europe’s inability to protect the Ukrainians and to deter Russia** from invading Ukraine, as happened in the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Why did Europe fail to prevent this war?

First and foremost, due to *security idiosyncrasies****.* Europe is not a collective security guarantor**. It dismissed this opportunity in 1954 when France refused to establish a European Defence Community (EDC). Thus, despite continuous efforts ever since, Europe does not have an army nor a deterrent capability. **It is, in fact, highly dependent on NATO** and individual nuclear powers (predominantly the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK and France) to guarantee its collective security.

However, the Russo-Ukrainian war displays the Euro-Atlantic community’s inability to maintain security assurances previously given to Kyiv under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. In this political agreement, the US, the UK and Russia pledged not to use military force against Ukraine in exchange for it renouncing the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia violated this agreement at least twice – with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the Euro-Atlantic guarantor countries failed to protect Ukraine.

However, the Memorandum’s greatest weakness lay in the fact that it was only politically, and not legally, binding. This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demands legally binding security guarantees instead of the Memorandum’s politically binding security assurances.

As a non-nuclear weapon state, which is not protected under a security guarantee by a nuclear weapon state or a nuclear alliance such as NATO, Ukraine was exposed to aggression or intended regime change carried out by an NPT-recognised nuclear weapon state. Hence, Europe and NATO could not have provided a nuclear umbrella to a non-allied state such as Ukraine. Without security guarantees or NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence, Ukraine was on its own in its direct confrontation against Russia.

Given the inability of major nuclear powers to uphold the Budapest Memorandum and the difficulty of enforcing credible security assurances due to Moscow’s actions, Ukraine proposed, on 29thMarch, security guarantees in which guarantor countries (such as the P5) must consult each other within three days after the beginning of military aggression or hybrid war. Within this scheme, after consultations, this group of countries must provide aid to Kyiv by sending troops, supplying weapons, and protecting Ukraine’s airspace. Ultimately, this proposal would exclude security guarantees potentially given by NATO or the EU and would ‘deresponsibilize’ Europe as a collective security guarantor of Ukraine.

The second reason Europe failed to prevent Putin’s war in Ukraine is because of nuclear policy choices. **The EU is basically a non**- **actor** (in proliferation not a nuclear deterrent one) who supports the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the EU has shown that its interests lie primarily in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials of the former Soviet states, leading to the establishment of TACIS. Indeed, **Brussels** **proved to be more concerned about the energy aspects** of nuclear security, generated mainly by the outcome of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, **than with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.**

It was only in the aftermath of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea and Donbass in 2014 that the EU’s Russia policy took Ukraine’s security seriously into account. But Brussels did not provide nuclear deterrent capabilities against Russia for the reasons stated above and, most importantly, as it is a de facto NPT regime guarantor.

The EU is critical of the view that more nuclear weapons can induce stability and decrease the chances of crisis escalation (nuclear stability theory), prominently defended by neo-realist Kenneth Waltz. As an NPT regime guarantor, Brussels supports the idea that nuclear proliferation is potentially the greatest threat to international and European security, requiring a concerted and multilateral response. For example, the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD stated that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states not only increases the likelihood of interstate nuclear conflict but increases the chances of nuclear material falling into the hands of violent non-state groups who are free from the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Therefore, **the EU has been more politically engaged** in ensuring Kyiv would not obtain nuclear weapons (mentioned, for example, in Article 11 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement) **than in providing Ukraine with** some kind of ‘**security** (nuclear) umbrella’.

The third reason is due to divergent political interests among EU member states. Since March 2014, the **EU** has adopted a strict non-recognition policy regarding Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. This policy led to substantive sanctions against Russia and prompted the EU to agree on five guiding principles to punish Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, these **actions did not deter Moscow** in Ukraine nor prevent the EU from negotiating trade and energy deals with Russia. **A lack of coherence among EU members affected the effective implementation of** the guiding principles and restrictive **measures** due to different political interests and positions towards Russia conditioned by threat perceptions, economic interests,and energy dependence.

#### Turn: The EU is too reliant on Russian energy to effectively deter – without NATO, no deterrence

**Vicente 5/4/22** -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, four key threat perception conclusions emerged: 1) a state geographically close to an adverse nuclear power increases threat perception (e.g. Finland and Sweden); 2) a state geographically far from an adverse nuclear power decreases threat perception (e.g. Portugal and Spain); 3) a shared history of conflict increases threat perception (e.g. the Baltic States and Poland); 4) a non-shared history of conflict decreases threat perception (e.g. Italy). In sum, the different degrees of threat perception of each European state towards Russia undermined the idea of European solidarity and cohesion and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the EU as a political player with regard to Ukraine.

**Europe’s energy dependence is another** conditioning **factor** of political divergence **within the EU.** For example, **the impact of Russia’s policy over EU** politics towards Ukraine, especially through its bargaining power **in the energy sector** (namely through Russian business proxies Nord stream and Gazprom), **led the Union to become more inactive and less effective**. **Other Russian activities** – such as increased activities of Russian funded media, intensified contact between Brussels and other European countries with Moscow, the spread of disinformation, and the sponsoring of Eurosceptic political forces – **impacted the ability of the EU to act effectively in opposition to Russian aggression.**

Furthermore, while the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement served as an important display of the EU’s economic and political force (soft power) towards Kyiv, **Russia continued to be one of the EU’s main economic and trade partners**. In fact, **European countries with different economic interests continued to negotiate large trade and energy deals with Russia at least until February 2022.**

This contrasting dual **approach led to**, even if indirectly, **the continuous funding of Moscow’s aggression machine** in Ukraine. For example, despite the 2014 EU arms embargo, according to a recent report, ten EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Finland, Slovakia and Spain) exported weapons to Russia until at least 2020. These countries relied on the use of a legal loophole in EU regulations that allowed the continuation of arms exports “contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts”. These legal loopholes, combined with other conditioning factors of political divergence, contributed to the half-hearted implementation of the EU sanctions policy.

Ultimately, **Europe could not prevent a Russian military invasion** of Ukraine **because of the EU’s** security idiosyncrasies, nuclear policy choices, **divergent political interests, energy dependency and ineffective** sanctions **policy on Russia**. Despite its failure to prevent the war, Europe has taken relevant steps over the past two months to respond to the invasion: They have rapprochement with their Atlantic allies (the UK and the US) and, among other initiatives, have established a Strategic Compass on Security and Defence, which could represent a unique opportunity for the EU tobecome a “more assertive and decisive security provider”.

#### The EU cannot fill in for NATO – the US is key to European defense capabilities

Meijer and Brooks 21 -- Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies and the Founding Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, and Stephen Gallup Brooks is a Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Published 2021. “Illusions of autonomy: Why Europe cannot provide for its security if the United States pulls back” [https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/7/1910610/isec\_a\_00405.pdf //](https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/7/1910610/isec_a_00405.pdf%20//) DG

The European ambition to seek strategic autonomy amid rising concerns over U.S. commitments to the continent and over Russia’s revisionist behavior raises an important counterfactual question: **Could Europeans develop an autonomous defense capacity if there were** a complete **U.S. withdrawal from Europe**? Although a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely in the short term, it is hardly a far-fetched scenario for the longer term. Examining this counterfactual is useful for two key reasons. First, a complete U.S. withdrawal—one entailing an exit from NATO and the withdrawal of all U.S. conventional and nuclear forces from the continent—is the strongest possible incentive that could drive the Europeans to pursue strategic autonomy, and is therefore the best way to assess their capacity to do so. Second, examination of this counterfactual advances the U.S. grand strategy debate in light of the prominent theoretical argument from U.S. “restraint” scholars such as Barry Posen, who argue that a U.S. withdrawal is warranted on the grounds that Europe can quickly and easily create an effective deterrent to Russia.9 As we explain, Europe is the key fulcrum in the grand strategy debate between these restraint scholars and “deep engagement” scholars, who favor maintaining current U.S. security commitments in Europe and elsewhere.10

Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of defined categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deficiency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Our analysis shows that **European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by** two major **constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls** that will be hard to close, **and** “strategic cacophony,” that is, **profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies,** most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, **if the U**nited **S**tates **were to withdraw** fully, **the continent would become significantly more vulnerable to Russian** meddling and **aggression**. Furthermore, **if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe** (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. **This**, in turn, **would make** institutionalized, intra-**European defense cooperation appreciably harder**.

Ultimately, we conclude that **the notion that Europeans would be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback is illusory.**13 And if even the major shock of a complete U.S. pullback would be very unlikely to move Europe away from its current strategic cacophony and capability shortfalls, a partial U.S. pullback—a much more likely counterfactual—would be more unlikely to do so. The policy implication is straightforward: if the United States wants European stability, it needs to stay in Europe.

European Defense Capacity Shortfall

European national assessments thus diverge profoundly regarding the prioritization among different threats. Significantly, Europe’s strategic cacophony greatly exacerbates a second overarching **constraint on Europe achieving strategic autonomy: severe military capacity gaps that cannot be closed anytime soon.** Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s defense capacity has markedly decreased.88 Operationally, the 2011 European military action in Libya revealed a severe shortage of key enablers for offensive military operations: the United States had to provide critical capabilities that the Europeans otherwise lacked, such as air-to-air refueling; suppression of enemy air defenses; and intelligence, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.89 Indeed, a recent systematic study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations found that, **because their capability shortfalls are so significant, Europeans would struggle to autonomously undertake operations even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict** (such as peace enforcement missions).90

### at: nato unsustainable

#### NATO is united now – invasion of Ukraine proves cooperation and strength are key

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The commandant of NATO Defense College said the cohesion of the alliance has been even reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent actions, now that the region sees the Russian threat.

Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann told Anadolu Agency in an interview that Ukraine was a partner of NATO and so there is a difference between a partner and an ally.

"Cohesion of NATO has been even reinforced by what President Vladimir Putin has been trying to achieve in Russia. Because now he **proved that Russia is actually a threat** for Europe and the whole area and it has really reinforced the cohesion and the solidarity between allies," Rittimann said.

Commenting on the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, he said Ukraine was a partner of NATO and the college has been working quite a lot with Ukraine for the last 20 years.

"In fact, if the recent events had not happened, we would have gone to Ukraine to work together in two weeks. Of course, we had to postpone this under the current conditions. I hope we just postponed it," he added.

He also stressed the Russian aggression that started in 2008 in Georgia and which continued in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas.

"So what it proves is that ... if you are a NATO ally you are still safe because we are (in) a solidarity with 30 allies working together and defending us together," he said.

Rittimann said the common response by every NATO member, every ally was to reject "this Russian invasion of Ukraine."

"I think that enlargement is something that needs to be decided first by NATO if they are accepting somebody to become a member and then by the nation which is interested in becoming a NATO member it is definitely not Russia nor China nor any others who has to decide whether Ukraine can become a NATO member or not.

"It is something that has to be discussed between the thirty members of NATO and the applicant. It's not to be interfered by anyone else," he added.

#### Russian invasion unites NATO now – provides a common enemy and security risk

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Less than three years ago, while President Donald Trump was threatening not to defend allies who didn’t pay enough for the privilege, French President Emmanuel Macron was lamenting the “brain death of NATO.” Things hardly seemed to improve when President Biden pulled U.S. troops out of Afghanistan (a NATO mission) after scant consultation with allies. As Kabul was falling, the Wall Street Journal ran an editorial headlined, “How Biden broke NATO.”

It turns out NATO is neither brain dead nor broken. The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has given the alliance a new lease on life, making it more politically united and militarily formidable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

NATO stands as one against Russian barbarism in Ukraine. Even Germany is boosting its anemic defense spending and finally sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Other states are doing far more, with the United States, Poland, Canada and Britain leading the way in providing arms and ammunition. NATO is doubling the number of battalion-size “battlegroups” deployed to the front-line states of Eastern Europe, from four to eight, while the United States has increased its troop deployment in Europe from 80,000 to 100,000 personnel.

Now even Sweden and Finland, which have long maintained their neutrality, are declaring their desire to join the alliance. They are almost certain to be admitted, despite Turkish reservations and predictable hand-wringing from pseudo-“realists” about provoking the Russian bear.

With Sweden and Finland as members, NATO will hit the strategic jackpot. Admitting them to NATO isn’t an act of charity. They are formidable military powers in their own right that can substantially contribute to deterring further Russian aggression.

Finland has a massive artillery force of 1,500 cannons along with F-18 fighter jets, multiple launch rocket systems, armored howitzers, a variety of precision-guided munitions and other high-tech systems. Helsinki is increasing its defense spending and recently finalized a deal to buy 64 F-35 fighters. Its active duty military is small (only 22,000 personnel), but it maintains conscription and can quickly mobilize 280,000 troops — a far larger force than what Russia sent into Ukraine.

The Kremlin made all sorts of threats to dissuade Finland from joining NATO, but the Finns aren’t deterred. They remember the heavy losses they inflicted on Russian invaders in the 1939-1940 Winter War and are not impressed by the poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine. Finland was even prepared for a cut off of Russian electricity that began on Saturday. Seeing that his bluster wasn’t working, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin was already backing away from his threats on Monday.

Sweden has roughly twice Finland’s population and a larger defense budget but a smaller military, with an active-duty force of 24,000 and only 31,800 reserves. But Stockholm is also increasing defense spending and expanding its armed forces. Its air force has ordered 204 of the domestically produced, top-of-the-line JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft. Sweden also manufactures quiet diesel submarines, and its navy plans to increase its submarine fleet from four to five while also buying new corvettes.

Sweden’s most important asset may be the island of Gotland, an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the middle of the Baltic Sea. With Gotland as a NATO base, the Baltic can become a NATO lake, just as British control of Malta turned the Mediterranean into an Allied lake in World War II. NATO planners have long feared that, in a war, it would be hard to resupply Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania because of all the weapons systems that Moscow has stockpiled in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania. Having Sweden and Finland in the alliance is a game changer and tilts the Northern battlefield in NATO’s favor.

NATO should continue to bolster front-line states with permanent, rather than rotational, troop deployments. The Baltic republics are particularly vulnerable because they are adjacent to Russia and have their own populations of Russian speakers, whose presence gives Putin a built-in excuse for aggression.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution argues that the United States should bolster its presence in the Baltics: “Something in the range of 10,000 American troops in the Baltic region — a brigade combat team (some 4,000 soldiers, plus support), an Army combat aviation brigade, and two to three squadrons of Air Force tactical aircraft — likely would be sufficient.” That commitment would be sufficiently small to not interfere with the imperative to deter China but large enough to substantially bolster the defense of these small democracies.

The supreme irony, of course, is that Putin justified his attack on Ukraine by claiming that Russia could not have another NATO state on its border — even though Ukraine was not going to be admitted to the alliance. Now Russia’s border with NATO will triple, from 316 to 952 miles. Putin has no one but himself to blame.

Good going, Vlad. Thank you for strengthening NATO. If only the price, measured in Ukrainian pain and suffering, weren’t so high.

#### Russia renews NATO’s purpose – overcomes friction over democracy and unites the alliance

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The talks allowed Mr. Putin to revisit Russian grievances over how the Cold War ended, in hopes of placing them back on the table for renegotiation 30 years later. His deputy foreign minister, Aleksandr V. Grushko, even warned the alliance off a “policy of containment” of Russia and insisted that “free choice does not exist in international relations” — suggesting that Ukraine would have to bow to Russian wishes.

But the more the discussion evoked the Cold War — with its firm dividing line through Europe, and its competing Russian and Western systems and spheres of influence — the more it reminded European and American allies of NATO’s purpose.

“Deterring Russia is in the DNA of NATO, because Russia is what can bring existential threats to European nations,” said Anna Wieslander, chair of Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development.

That threat now is more than territorial, she said. Russia is also trying to undermine NATO’s democratic cohesion. “Russia is targeting our elections, our social media, our parliaments and our citizens, and it is become more obvious now that Russia is not part of our value system,” Ms. Wieslander said.

As it drafts a new strategic concept to be ready this year, NATO is concentrating on “resilience” against new hybrid and cyberthreats, highlighting its defense of the democratic institutions of member states, not just their territory.

“NATO is its member states, and it’s what allies make of it,” said Sophia Besch, a defense analyst in Berlin for the Center for European Reform. “It’s not out of business because we didn’t let it, and we’ve changed its raison d’être to what are the major strategic concerns of the day.”

The old joke was that if NATO is the answer, what is the question? Ms. Besch responded: “We’ve changed the question over the years to make NATO the answer. And now we’re back at the old question again, where NATO is more comfortable.”

NATO is especially important now for those states bordering Russia, like the Baltic nations and Poland, a country which has had [deepening strains with its European partners](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/world/europe/eu-poland-rule-of-law.html) over the protection of core democratic principles, which Brussels has accused the government in Warsaw of eroding.

But the current crisis is a reminder, even in Poland, of the importance of the alliance as a whole, and not just the country’s bilateral relationship with the United States, said Piotr Buras, head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Ukraine has proved especially vulnerable to Russian threats perhaps precisely because it is not a NATO member.

“In Poland there was concern that NATO would lose its focus on Russian security threats, but now it’s obvious that this is the only framework that can protect us and provide long-term security,” Mr. Buras said.

There was also anxiety that President Biden, in trying to stabilize relations with Russia to [pivot toward China](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html), would bargain away forward-based NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics that were deployed after 2014.

“But there is no sign that the United States will give in on fundamental issues to NATO,” like its open-door policy and its right to deploy forces in any member state, Mr. Buras said, and Washington has been rigorous in briefing its allies about all of its discussions with Russia.

Still, he said, the current crisis “is a very clear consequence of the U.S. pivot to Asia and the realization of Russia that it might now take advantage of that reorientation of U.S. fundamental security interests,” he said. “And that issue will not go away soon.”

Russia will continue to press for a new security framework in Europe, and Europe without the United States is not prepared to play any significant role, he said, so “for Poland, NATO is the key and irreplaceable element.”

Even as Poland’s battle with the European Union over the rule of law still festers, it is not an overt issue in the military alliance of NATO. But it was very noticeable that as the crisis over Ukraine mounted, President Andrzej Duda of Poland chose to veto a law, criticized by Washington, which would have stripped majority ownership of an independent television station from an American company.

As the security situation in Central Europe has worsened with Russian aggression and threats, Poland “got what we finally wanted when we joined NATO, which is allied and American troop presence on our soil — to finally bring NATO deployments beyond Germany,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund.

That is precisely one of Russia’s current demands — that those deployments in Poland and the Baltic States be removed, a demand rejected by Mr. Biden and by NATO, to Poland’s relief.

Still, Mr. Baranowski said, the Russians have mobilized the largest military force in Europe since 1989, “and that’s scary.” The alliance, he said, “is closer to military confrontation, but at least we have not folded.”

But the crisis has also highlighted the continuing dependence of NATO on Washington. For Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, what is striking is how much “this is the old NATO, where the U.S. is the glue, linchpin and indispensable leader of the alliance,” bringing allies together, informing them and “putting on the table the strategy we will pursue.”

What is extraordinary, he said, is that more than 70 years after the alliance was founded, “there appears to be no independent European strategy or even a European point of view different from what Washington brought to the table.” NATO has divisions, of course, Mr. Daalder said. “But all the divisions are dissolved, at least for today.”

Whether that unity will last should Mr. Putin move farther into Ukraine is yet to be seen, said Kadri Liik, an analyst with the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. She sees an unwillingness in Europe to understand that the world is shifting.

“The wider public is not prepared for any change in the arrangements we’ve lived with for the past 30 years,” she said. “People think we can still sanction Russia into obeying the European security order, and that all it takes is Western unity and principles.”

But the United States is leading the world differently, Ms. Liik said. “I’m just not sure we can expect to continue to live in the world that corresponds to rules and norms and expect America to enforce them.”

That applies to Russia and Europe, too, she said. “We’re slowly headed back to a world” of confrontation between systems with different views about obeying the rules and the use of power and force.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor believes that Mr. Putin saw an opportunity to take advantage of a shakier trans-Atlantic alliance, a divided Europe and a polarized America with a weakened president.

NATO unity is real but untested, she said. “It’s too early to declare all restored, because Russia not done anything yet,” Ms. Kendall-Taylor said. “It’s a bit the calm before the storm.”